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Copy pathSeminar 7-Static and Dynamic games with Complete Information.out
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Seminar 7-Static and Dynamic games with Complete Information.out
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\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.1}{Problem\0401\040-\040Simultaneous\040and\040sequential\040moves\040with\040complete\040information\040\(static\040and\040dynamic\040pizza\040game\)}{}% 1
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.1}{What\040is\040\(are\)\040each\040player's\040best\040response\(s\)\040for\040each\040of\040the\040possible\040demands\040for\040his/her\040opponent?}{section.1}% 2
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.2}{Find\040all\040the\040pure-strategy\040Nash\040equilibria}{section.1}% 3
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.3}{Explain\040what\040a\040strategy\040is\040for\040player\0402\040in\040this\040game\040with\040sequential\040moves.}{section.1}% 4
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.4}{Find\040all\040the\040pure-strategy\040Nash\040equilibrium\040outcomes.\040}{section.1}% 5
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.1.5}{Find\040all\040the\040pure-strategy\040subgame\040perfect\040equilibria.}{section.1}% 6
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.2}{Problem\0402\040-\040Best\040response\040sets}{}% 7
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.3}{Problem\0403\040-\040BR\040functions,\040NE,\040rationalizable\040strategies}{}% 8
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.1}{\376\377\000C\000a\000l\000c\000u\000l\000a\000t\000e\000\040\000a\000n\000d\000\040\000g\000r\000a\000p\000h\000\040\000e\000a\000c\000h\000\040\000p\000l\000a\000y\000e\000r\000'\000s\000\040\000b\000e\000s\000t\000-\000r\000e\000s\000p\000o\000n\000s\000e\000\040\000f\000u\000n\000c\000t\000i\000o\000n\000\040\000a\000s\000\040\000a\000\040\000f\000u\000n\000c\000t\000i\000o\000n\000\040\000o\000f\000\040\000t\000h\000e\000\040\000o\000p\000p\000o\000s\000i\000n\000g\000\040\000p\000l\000a\000y\000e\000r\040\031\000s\000\040\000p\000u\000r\000e\000\040\000s\000t\000r\000a\000t\000e\000g\000y\000.}{section.3}% 9
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.2}{Find\040and\040report\040the\040Nash\040equilibria\040of\040the\040game.}{section.3}% 10
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.3.3}{Determine\040the\040rationalizable\040strategy\040profiles\040for\040this\040game.}{section.3}% 11
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.4}{Problem\0404\040-\040True\040or\040False?}{}% 12
\BOOKMARK [1][-]{section.5}{Problem\0405-\040Firm-union\040bargaining}{}% 13
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.5.1}{Formulate\040this\040situation\040as\040an\040extensive\040game\040with\040perfect\040information.\040}{section.5}% 14
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.5.2}{Find\040the\040subgame\040perfect\040equilibrium\040\(equilibria?\)\040of\040the\040game.}{section.5}% 15
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.5.3}{Is\040there\040an\040outcome\040of\040the\040game\040that\040both\040parties\040prefer\040to\040any\040subgame\040perfect\040equilibrium\040outcome?\040}{section.5}% 16
\BOOKMARK [2][-]{subsection.5.4}{Find\040a\040Nash\040equilibrium\040for\040which\040the\040outcome\040differs\040from\040any\040subgame\040perfect\040equilbrium\040outcome.}{section.5}% 17